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Resumo
A Suécia e a Cooperação Europeia de Segu-
rança: O Internacionalista Europeu
A política de segurança e defesa sueca mudou
radicalmente desde o fim da Guerra Fria. A
neutralidade foi abandonada, sendo o
não-alinhamento significativo na forma como
salvaguarda a independência relativamente a
quaisquer compromissos de aliança militar. A
Suécia tem apoiado o desenvolvimento de
uma Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa
(PESD), sendo um parceiro activo na arqui-
tectura de cooperação da NATO. Estas inicia-
tivas teriam sido impensáveis durante a Guerra
Fria. No entanto, este artigo suporta a ideia de
que as mudanças da política sueca de segu-
rança e defesa são enquadradas por uma tra-
dição de política externa de alcance mundial
de feitura do bem, que precede o fim da Guer-
ra Fria e que se enquadra numa concepção de
internacionalismo moral. O envolvimento sue-
co nas operações da PESD e NATO é visto
como servindo um conceito alargado de segu-
rança. Assim se explica como é que a Suécia se
envolveu tão empenhadamente na cooperação
com a UE e com a NATO, e se justifica uma
reduzida polémica no debate político interno
relativamente às mudanças sobre a política
sueca de segurança e defesa.
Abstract
Swedish security and defence policy has changed
radically since the end of the Cold War. Swedish
neutrality has been abandoned and non-alignment
is only relevant in terms of standing free of any
military alliance commitments. Sweden is a staunch
supporter of the development of the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the
European Union and a keen partner within the
NATO framework of cooperation. These policies
would have been unthinkable during the Cold
War. Yet, this article suggests that these profound
changes to Swedish security and defence policy
have been framed within a Swedish foreign policy
tradition of ‘doing good’ in the world that predates
the end of the Cold War; a role conception of
moralistic internationalism. Swedish involvement
within the ESDP and NATO-operations is thus
seen to be serving Swedish broader concepts of
security. This explains why Sweden has so rapidly
come to embrace EU and NATO co-operation and
why the subsequent changes to Swedish security
and defence policy have stirred so little controversy
in the domestic political debate.
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Introduction
Sweden is not part of any military alliance. The future
security of our country is based on community and
cooperation with other countries (Swedish Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, 2007).
Swedish security and defence policy has changed tremendously since the end of the
Cold War. Non-alignment is significant only in the sense that Sweden stands free of
formal military defence commitments. In all other matters, the emphasis is on Swedish
involvement and cooperation based on a broad concept of security. Sweden is a keen
supporter of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union (EU).
It embraces a closer partnership with NATO in non-article five areas. Within the Nordic
framework, Sweden seeks a new dynamics of cooperation as a bridge between European
and transatlantic security policies. This type of cooperation would have been unthinkable
during the Cold War, when Sweden avoided entanglements in security and defence that
could have been seen to compromise its policy of non-alignment and its ambition to stand
neutral in the event of war.
Yet, underneath these torrents of change, there are still elements of continuity that
provide a framework in which these new changes in security and defence policy take
place. A key argument of this article is that an important reason why the changes in
Swedish security and defence policy since the end of the Cold War have not been more
controversial and contested is that they are justified with reference to Swedish traditions
of ‘doing good’ in the world (Bergman 2004, Strömvik 2006), and to a broader concept of
security. These traditions in the security and defence field originally developed during
the Cold War but continue to serve as a broad conceptual framework to legitimise
changes in Swedish security and defence policy.
The admixture of continuity and change in Swedish security and defence policy is
analysed in five parts of this article. The first part provides a brief historical background
to Swedish traditions in security and defence policy. The second part examines shifts in
Swedish concepts of security that privilege a broader interpretation. The third part
considers why Sweden, a country that is not renowned for being a Euro-enthusiast in
other areas, is such a keen supporter of the ESDP. This backing of the ESDP, however, is
not at the expense of other forms of security cooperation. In part four, it is argued that
Swedish security and defence policy is characterised by a functional approach to cooperation
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which means that Sweden seeks close collaboration also with the Nordic countries and
NATO. The final part considers the domestic context which continues to be a constraining
factor to changes in Swedish security and defence policy.
Traditions in Swedish security policy
Neutrality is not mentioned today as a principle or doctrine of Swedish security
policy. Yet, to understand the distinctiveness and particular interpretation of military
non-alignment that still constitute a guide to Swedish security policy, it is important to
draw attention to the historical roots and traditions of this policy.
The first thing to note is that Swedish neutrality was never based on a legal treaty or
document, but rather a declared ambition to be non-aligned in peace and neutral in the
event of war. This meant that Swedish neutrality was self-imposed and as such needed
to be interpreted and continuously re-stated to be credible. For many years, this policy
was widely seen to have served Swedish interests well, even if it later transpired that
cooperation with Western powers was secretly pursued within a small elite circle of the
Swedish government at the time.
During the Cold War, Swedish foreign and security policy was influenced by two
traditions: small state realism and liberal internationalism (Aggestam 2001: 183). Small
state realism was expressed through a preoccupation with ‘national survival’ and thus
closely linked to concepts of sovereignty. A credible policy of neutrality was to be
maintained through a strong and self-reliant territorial army (based on conscription) and
an independent arms industry. In peacetime, Swedish non-alignment was seen to contribute
to stability and confidence-building between the blocs in the strategically sensitive
northern flank of Europe. Swedish foreign and security policy aimed therefore to stay
clear of any formal commitments and alignments that could compromise Swedish
independence and freedom of action within Europe itself. This certainly excluded Swedish
membership of NATO, but it also foreclosed full membership of the European Community
(as it was then called). Instead, Swedish security cooperation was predominantly promoted
within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
However, neutrality was not seen to preclude the pursuit of an active foreign policy
with strong tenets of liberal internationalism, particularly through the United Nations. In
contrast to some other neutral states, like Switzerland, membership of the UN ranked
higher than concerns for a strict interpretation of neutrality. Indeed, Swedish non-alignment
207
The European Internationalist: Sweden and European Security Cooperation
within the context of the UN was seen to provide Sweden with a distinct position to
pursue a progressive foreign policy beyond the strictures of Cold War politics that built
on ideas of ‘common security’ and a more extended concept of duties beyond national
borders. This entailed a commitment to international development, confidence-building,
disarmament, and peacekeeping operations. To this day, the United Nations enjoys
wide-ranging support from Swedish political parties and the domestic population alike,
and may explain why the transference of peacekeeping and support operations to the
European Union and NATO, have been relatively uncontroversial (Herolf 2007: 50).
Concepts of security
The two traditions of state realism and liberal internationalism have in turn informed
Swedish concepts of security. In a narrow definition, security refers to national defence
and military non-alignment. The broader notion relates to aspects of international security
that do not involve territorial defence, such as peacekeeping, foreign aid, and global
disarmament (Aggestam 2001: 191). What has happened since the end of the Cold War is
that the narrow concept of security associated with territorial defence has gradually given
way to a broader conception of security to meet a wider spectrum of threats now
conceived. As Pernille Rieker (2003: 124) argues, ‘Swedish security identity has changed
from being characterised by neutrality and territorial defence, to increased Europeanism
and international crisis management’. A conflation of Swedish security interests with
broader questions of international peace and security has taken place. Rather than a
narrow territorial conception of threat, the Swedish government subscribes to the threats
outlined in the European Security Strategy, such as regional instability, state failure,
organised crime, international terrorism and WMD proliferation.
A major reason for this conceptual shift is that no major, or imminent military threat
to Sweden is identified. Hence, the Swedish armed forces have over the last decade been
undergoing a fundamental transformation, moving steadily away from a territorial
defence structure towards one that is flexible and increasingly focused on participating
in international crisis management operations. This was clearly outlined in the government
bill ‘Our future defence’, where a conflation between Swedish security and efforts to
strengthen international peace and security was made.1 The new post-cold war threats are
1 ‘Vårt framtida försvar’, Proposition 2004/05: 5, Stockholm: Swedish Ministry for Defence.
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seen to affect Sweden more indirectly given that few of them are in Sweden’s immediate
geographical vicinity. War and conflict in the former Yugoslavia have been indicative of
the kind of threat Sweden now identifies, which even if limited in geographical scope,
was had repercussions throughout Europe. Sweden has contributed with troops throughout
the conflicts on the Balkan, both under UN flag, NATO-command and more recently
under the banner of the EU. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia also affected Sweden
profoundly in terms of the large number of refugees that came to Sweden. Similarly, on
a more global scale, the war in Iraq, against which Sweden stood at the time, has deeply
affected Sweden, in the sense that approximately half the refugees arriving in Europe
chose to seek asylum in Sweden.2
Swedish concepts of security are therefore informed by what happens in the world
globally rather than focusing exclusively on its regional vicinity. It also signifies a more
extended notion of security to include the security of ‘others’, that is, people outside of
the national perimeters of Sweden. However, it should be noted that this mission of
‘doing good’ in the world is not simply altruistic, but serves to address Swedish security
concerns as well, as the examples of Yugoslavia and Iraq above illustrate.
Swedish defence efforts are thus increasingly focused on international crisis
management. To this end, Sweden has developed a Rapid Reaction Unit, become the lead
nation in the Nordic Battlegroup for rapid EU interventions, and is currently involved in
NATO-led operations in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR). Sweden is also in the
process of preparing to send over 200 soldiers on an ESDP-mission to Chad. The intention
is that these kind of operations should increase in the future (Tolgfors 2007). Again, while
these missions are justified in terms of working towards defending peace, security and
development, there are also instrumental reasons accompanying these changes to Swedish
security and defence policy, namely the influence that Sweden thinks it gains by being
active and involved in these international structures of security cooperation. For as the
Swedish Minister for Defence, Sten Tolgfors (2007), clearly states, ‘We also gain influence
in international organisations and in conflict resolution. Our participation strengthens
Sweden’s voice abroad’. This underlying reason is an important consideration for why
Sweden is such a staunch supporter of the development of the European Security and
Defence Policy of the European Union.
2 The reason for this is that Sweden has relatively liberal asylum laws, but large numbers were also drawn
to Sweden because of the already substantial number of Iraqis living there. See further, Tobias Billström,
Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy, and Cecilia Malmström, Minister for EU Affairs. ’Iraqis taking
refuge in Sweden,’ International Herald Tribune, 13-14 January 2007.
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The European Union: a ‘force for good’ in the world
A vital task for Sweden today is to contribute to even
stronger European cooperation, making the Union the
force in the service of peace, freedom and reconciliation
that the world more and more obviously needs. We
therefore want Sweden to be at the heart of the
European cooperation. This is why cooperation within
the European Union has a special status in Swedish
foreign and security policy. (Carl Bildt, Swedish
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2007).
The transformation of the European security order and the evolving process of
European integration has presented Sweden with opportunities to become involved in an
unprecedented way with its European neighbours after the end of the Cold War.
References to a European identity and responsibilities have become frequent markers in
Swedish foreign policy speeches and symbolize the ambition that Swedish governments
have had in carving out an active new role for Sweden in the evolving security structures
emerging in post-cold war Europe. What is interesting to observe is how the transformation
of Swedish security policy has taken place hand in hand with a growing recognition of
the European Union as an important security actor in its own right, both processes being
justified on the grounds of ‘doing good’ and building peace in the world (cf. Bildt 2007,
Solana 2007).
Yet, given that Sweden still retains its policy of military non-alignment, it is not in
favour of any European defence system that would involve mutual defence guarantees,
nor does Sweden want to see moves towards a more militarised EU. Since becoming an
EU member in 1995, Sweden has, however, made a great effort to emphasise that
membership means that Sweden is part of a political alliance. As such, it would be
difficult for Sweden to remain indifferent if one of the EU members was under threat and
attacked. Thus, it is important to underline that Sweden perceives a moral obligation to
aid another member if attacked (and this is largely a bipartisan issue among the major
political parties in Sweden), while eschewing official guarantees to that effect. It could
also be argued that this distinction has become increasingly blurred after the terrorist
attacks in Madrid and London, after which EU member states were quick to sign up to
a common declaration of solidarity. Nonetheless, Sweden remains wary of discussions in
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the EU that may imply an increased militarization or any suggestions towards developing
common European defence structures. This demonstrates the continued hold that
non-alignment continues to have on Swedish security policy. It also explains why Sweden
has sought a distinctive approach to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and
the subsequent development of the ESDP.
Right from the start of its membership of the European Union, Sweden focused its
efforts to shape the CFSP, and later on the ESDP, to reflect its own distinct ideas about
European cooperation in this area. During the Intergovernmental Conference 1996/7,
Sweden made a number of proposals to strengthen the effectiveness of the CFSP.
Particularly important was a joint Swedish-Finnish paper, first published in April 1996,
suggesting that a more formal link between the Western European Union (WEU) and the
EU should be established to improve the CFSP’s capacity in crisis management. This
specifically concerned the so-called Petersberg tasks of peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions.3 In the Amsterdam Treaty, the WEU merged with the EU while the mutual
defence guarantees in the original WEU-treaty were left outside. This was not only seen
as a success in expanding the security role of the European Union, but for Sweden it was
also an important outcome in terms of influence. Sweden had previously only held an
observer status within the WEU which meant limited influence in terms of decisions and
implementation. With these decisions now taken within the EU, Sweden would become
more influential in the policy-making process.
Another area where Sweden has made its mark is in civilian crisis management. While
fully supporting the initial Anglo-French agreement of 1998 to develop a European
Security and Defence Policy, there was also concern in Sweden that the genesis of the
ESDP was focused predominantly on military crisis management. The Swedish government
was therefore keen to see the EU develop the civilian aspects of crisis management. At the
European Council in Feira 2000, it was decided that the EU should develop civilian
capabilities regarding policing, the rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection
within the ESDP-framework. During the Swedish EU Presidency of 2001, the Swedish
government successfully brought the concept of conflict prevention onto the EU agenda
and thus anchored a more comprehensive concept of security within the EU.
But it would be wrong to overemphasise the Swedish desire to develop the civilian
dimension of the ESDP at the exclusion of everything else. Sweden promotes a
comprehensive approach to security in the EU and that also involves a recognition of the
3 Lena Hjelm-Wallén and Tarja Halonen, Dagens Nyheter, 21 April 1996.
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need for a military capability to back up EU policies (Tolgfors 2007). Hence, Sweden
readily made contributions to the initial EU Headline Goal of 1999, and more recently, to
the Headline Goal of 2010, to which Sweden provides the major share of a Nordic
Battlegroup to be operative in the first half of 2008.4 Sweden has contributed to all ESDP
missions so far. It is also noteworthy that Sweden contributed with special forces
alongside the French in the only peace enforcement operation the EU has undertaken so
far, that is, the Artemis operation in Congo 2003. Indeed, a major reason for Swedish
support of the ESDP, be it in civilian or military crisis management, is the contribution it
can make to the UN. Support for UN crisis management is seen as one of the most
important tasks of the ESDP. This explains why the Swedish government feels a strong
imperative to contribute troops to such ESDP-missions as we are currently seeing
assembled to be sent to Darfur and Chad (EUFOR Chad/FCA).
The strength of Sweden’s commitment to ESDP does not however take place at the
expense of cooperation with other security organisations. Indeed, as we will be discussing
below, the continued role that non-alignment still plays in Swedish security policy tends
to encourage a more functional approach to security cooperation. Rather than an ideological
preference for particular institutions, it is the task at hand that determines the framework
of cooperation.
Functional cooperation
Given that Sweden is militarily non-aligned, different institutions for security
cooperation tend to be seen as mutually reinforcing and overlapping rather than in terms
of institutional rivalry. This is also reflected in the stance taken to the transformation of
the Swedish armed forces with the emphasis on flexibility and the ability to work within
different organisations. Apart from the EU, foremost among these frameworks of
cooperation are the Nordic countries and NATO.
Nordic cooperation
Despite being similar in many ways, not least in terms of political culture, the Nordic
countries have traditionally chosen their own distinctive paths when it comes to security.
4 For details on the Nordic Battlegroup, see Andersson (2006).
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Only Sweden and Finland actively participate in the ESDP. Denmark has opted out of EU
military cooperation but is a NATO-member along with Norway, who in turn is not a
member of the EU. The end of the Cold War seems, however, to have instigated a new
dynamics of cooperation between the Nordic countries, both within the framework of the
Nordic Council and bilaterally. ‘There is a strong mutual political will to look for new
forms of cooperation and common solutions within new areas’ as the Swedish Minister
for Defence (Tolgfors 2007) observes. With the decline in focus on the narrow territorial
conception of security, the security concerns they share on the international level have
come to the forefront. The Nordic countries share a similar outlook on issues like the
support for international law, the UN system, international poverty reduction and
development, human rights and international peacekeeping.
This cooperation takes place on different levels. Firstly, the Nordic Council now
includes security and defence cooperation and has been extended to include the three
Baltic states on a number of issues. Particularly in the early days of Baltic states’
independence, the Nordic countries helped them build up their military capabilities.
Secondly, the Nordic countries have increasingly worked together on different crisis
management and peace operations, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. More lately,
they have formed the Nordic Battlegroup for EU-led international crisis management
missions. Sweden contributes by far the largest share with over 2,000 troops. Other
contributing countries are Finland, Norway, Estonia and also more recently Ireland.
Thirdly, bilateral cooperation and initiatives have also become more frequent between
different Nordic countries. Within the EU, it is natural for Sweden to join up with Finland
on different initiatives. Bilateral cooperation between Sweden and Norway are also
becoming closer. Indeed, the Defence chiefs in Norway and Sweden suggested recently to
their respective governments that Sweden and Norway should develop what they call a
new ‘military cooperation axis’, urging their governments to leave old hang-ups about
sovereignty behind and seek new forms of cooperation, not least in the field of new
defence material.5
What is interesting to note is that at a time when relations between the European
Union and NATO are plagued by difficulties, the Nordic countries, given their mix of
membership with NATO and the EU, are seen as potentially ‘instrumental in bridging the
gap between EU and NATO’ (Tolgfors 2007). This is why the call for intensified Nordic
5 ‘Nytt försvarssamarbete mellan Sverige och Norge’, Sverre Diesen and Håkan Syrén, Dagens Nyheter 31
August 2007.
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cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic context is increasingly made. Again, the Nordic
Battlegroup (NBG) is seen as an important precedent in this regard. As Tolgfors (2007)
claims, ‘[t]he NBG illustrates how the division between members and non-members of EU
and NATO is becoming less obvious in ongoing international cooperation and operations’.
Transatlantic cooperation
A key symbol of Sweden’s continued military non-alignment remains non-membership
of NATO. However, throughout the post-cold war period, a gradual re-evaluation of
NATO has been underway, bringing Sweden much closer to NATO. NATO’s growing
political role and involvement in crisis management and security cooperation in non-article
five areas have opened up space for Swedish partnership with NATO in a range of
activities. NATO has become a close partner through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council and through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. Tellingly, it is with
NATO rather than the EU that Sweden so far has contributed most troops in international
operations. As of September 2007, Sweden is involved under NATO-command in the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with a troop of around
330 and in Kosovo Force (KFOR) with 385 soldiers.6
Swedish participation in the PfP programme means that Sweden has initiated a
formalized link with NATO, something that would have been hard to imagine during the
cold war. PfP involves no security guarantees or commitments, but in the event of
military attack political consultation may be sought. PfP provides a useful forum of
contacts and consultation, primarily regarding peacekeeping operations, but also in other
areas such as civil preparedness.
Rather than focusing on the membership question, the most interesting analytical
level to study Sweden’s adaptation to NATO is the operational level. Arguably, a key
to the internationalisation of the Swedish armed forces is interoperability, which in
practice means an adaptation to NATO standards of operating procedures to facilitate
multinational efforts in peacekeeping missions. Sweden is continuously involved in major
PfP exercises which encourage a deeper standardisation of the Swedish armed forces to
NATO.
The Centre-right government of Reinfeldt contains two parties in the coalition that
favours NATO-membership. The question of membership is however not on the swedish
6 See www.mil.se/int.
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agenda at the moment. A major reason for this is the consistent evidence in public opinion
surveys that this would have no clear support among the broader public in Sweden. The
present Swedish government has nonetheless made much more of Sweden’s involvement
with NATO and accused its predecessors of Berührungsangst.7
Despite the absence of NATO-membership, Sweden is in fact a strong supporter of
transatlantic relations and close relations with the United States (Tolgfors 2007). Swedish
support of the EU’s ESDP does not mean that Sweden subscribes to the French view of
Europe as a counterbalance to the US in a multipolar world. Rather, in many respects
Sweden is closer to the UK in emphasising the complementarity of EU-NATO relations.
As a small state, there are also considerable lingering feelings that it is in Swedish
interests to see a continued American military presence in Europe as an ultimate
guarantee for stability in the North of Europe.
The domestic context
Similarly to many other countries, Swedish security and defence policy is largely
characterised by a bipartisan approach. In Sweden, this has also deep roots in political
culture given that unity on the principle of non-alignment and neutrality was seen as an
important element for the policy to be credible. Yet, underneath this consensual approach
there are growing divisions that are becoming more visible and politicised.
The current government with Fredrik Reinfeldt as Prime Minister speaks with greater
emphasis about the significance of Sweden’s involvement in the European Security and
Defence Policy and Sweden’s relations with NATO, in comparison with the previous
Social Democratic government. This has so far been more noticeable in terms of style than
policy. Yet, it has stirred enough unease among the opposition parties for them to call for
new cross-party talks on defence policy.8 Two of the parties in the coalition government
are in favour of NATO-membership and Sweden’s diplomatic representation at
NATO-Headquarters in Brussels has recently been substantially upgraded.9 The latest
round of cuts in the Swedish defence budget have also raised questions about the
underlying logic informing Swedish defence policy.
7 Gunilla Herolf, ‘A new policy for Sweden?’, Europe’s World, www.europesworld.org/
8 Svenska Dagbladet 16 September 2007, ‘Sahlin kräver försvarsöverläggningar’.
9 Dagens Nyheter 19 December 2007, ‘Nato graderas upp i UD:s struktur’.
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Swedish involvement in international peace operations enjoys widespread support
among the Swedish public as it is seen as part of a long-standing tradition of Swedish
peacekeeping activities. Swedish cooperation with the EU and NATO is thus seen as
a continuation of this policy and hence enjoys support as long as operations are
mandated by the UN or the OSCE. However, there is little discussion and debate
more generally about the transformation that this involvement entails for Swedish
defence policy in the long run, neither is there much coverage in the news about
Swedish forces being sent under EU-flag to Africa or under NATO-command to
Afghanistan. As Pernille Rieker (2003: 124) notes, ‘there has been an important
difference between the Swedish discourse at home, and that expressed on the
international level. While Sweden presented a rather progressive line of security
thinking in various international frameworks, at home the security discourse remained
far more traditional and military-focused’.
There are, however, certain risks in not having a more profound debate about the
transformation of Swedish security and defence policy after the end of the cold war.
Firstly, if an international operation goes badly wrong and soldiers die, issues about
Swedish involvement in these kind of missions may suddenly become more politicised
and questioned due to a lack of knowledge. Close partnership with a military alliance
could bring a non-aligned state, such as Sweden, into politically sensitive situations as the
definition of ‘peacekeeping activities’ may not always be clear-cut. Secondly, whilst
Swedish security and defence policy has been transformed since the end of the Cold War,
these changes have taken place gradually without clear political leadership providing a
sense of direction. There is still considerable support for Swedish non-alignment among
the Swedish public and without leadership for change, this makes it unlikely that, for
instance, membership of NATO would become a serious option in the near future. In any
case, it would require a general referendum preceding it (Herolf 2007: 48). The United
Nations is still seen as the only international organization that provides international
legitimacy for the use of force.
Concluding remarks: Europeanisation and small states
The study of change in the security policy of small states tends to focus on the
processes of adaptation that have taken place since the end of the cold war to the new
realities of international order and emergent structures of security cooperation.
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To be sure, EU membership has in the case of Sweden spurred several changes
and adaptations at the domestic level. Yet, it has been argued in this article that
Sweden has also been able to shape security policy in the European Union in a way
that reflects Swedish preferences and concepts of security. The merger of the
WEU with the EU at the end of the 1990s, and the development of civilian crisis
management and conflict prevention as part of the ESDP-policy have been important
Swedish initiatives to shape the emergent security structures within the EU.
Europeanisation of Swedish security policy should therefore not be seen simply in
terms of adaptation, but crucially the success with which Sweden has been able to
shape this structure of cooperation in the first place. However, whilst this point
about the co-constitutive nature of Europeanisation is much less controversial to
make in terms of the bigger member states of the Union, particularly with reference
to the EU-3 (Aggestam 2006), it is rarely made with reference to small states. The fact
that Sweden as a small state has been able to exercise a decisive role within the ESDP
– arguably punching above its weight as a non-aligned state – should encourage us
to explore further the different dynamics of security cooperation within the European
Union.
For Sweden, the perception of being able to have an influence within the CFSP
and ESDP has largely been a positive experience which explains the continued
enthusiasm that this area of European integration enjoys among policy-makers.
However, this support is conditioned on the way the ESDP develops in the future.
The French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has already signalled ahead of the French
Presidency of the EU that he would like to beef up the military dimension of the EU.
While the Swedish government clearly recognizes, and indeed endorses the fact that
the EU needs to have the ability to use military force as a last resort, there is still a
strong preference for non-military instruments to be used and that all operations on
military issues operate under UN cover. Movements towards more structured defence
cooperation within the EU would be likely to compromise Swedish enthusiasm for
the ESDP as long as the policy of non-alignment continues.
At the same time, Sweden has become deeply enmeshed in the EU and it would
be hard to envisage a situation in which Sweden would seek to stand neutral in the
event of an armed attack on another EU country. While Sweden is a country that
naturally favours intergovernmental procedures of cooperation, another legacy of
non-alignment, there are also fears that since the failure of the European Constitution,
EU policy is increasingly becoming re-nationalised with a more distinct dominance
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of the larger states in the process, as in recent initiatives by the EU-3. The Swedish
government’s favourable stance towards an increase in majority voting and a
strengthened position for the High Representative of the CFSP and ESDP should be
seen in this light. Significantly, the Swedish government also favours a common
military planning headquarter in Brussels in favour of the five existing national
headquarters. It remains to be seen what, if any, initiatives the Swedish government
will promote for European security cooperation during its Presidency of the European
Union in the latter half of 2009.
References
Aggestam, Lisbeth, (2001), ‘An end to neutrality? Continuity and change in Swedish
foreign policy’, in R. Niblett and W. Wallace, eds., Rethinking European order: West
European responses, 1989-97, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Aggestam, Lisbeth (2006), ‘What role for the EU in security and defence? British, French
and German views of the ESDP’, SIIA Papers, No 1.
Andersson, Jan Joel, (2006), ‘Armed and Ready? The EU Battlegroup Concept and the
Nordic Battlegroup’, Stockholm: Sieps, No 2.
Bergman, Annika (2004), ‘The Nordic Militaries-Forces For Good?’, in L. Elliot & G.
Cheesman, eds., Forces for Good? Cosmopolitan Militaries in the 21st Century, Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Bildt, Carl (2007), Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on
Foreign Affairs, 14 February.
Herolf, Gunilla (2007), ‘Overcoming National Impediments to ESDP’, in K. Brummer, ed.,
The North and the ESDP: The Baltic States, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, Gütersloh:
Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Rieker, Pernille (2003), Europeanisation of Nordic security: the EU and the changing security
identities of the Nordic states, Department f Political Science, PhD dissertation, Faculty of
Social Sciences, University of Oslo.
Solana, Javier, (2007), ‘Countering globalisation’s dark side’, Europe’s World, Policy
Dossier, Autumn 2007.
The European Internationalist: Sweden and European Security Cooperation
218
Strömvik, Maria (2006), ’Starting to “think big”: the Nordic countries and EU peace-
-building’, in Alyson J. K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius (eds), The
Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Tolgfors, Sten, (2007), ‘Enhanced Nordic cooperation in a Euro-Atlantic context’, Speech
at the Swedish Atlantic Council conference, Stockholm, 9 November 2007.
Lisbeth Aggestam
